Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East suffered several setbacks in the early and mid-1970's. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled most Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972 and abrogated his treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in 1976. The Arabs widely blamed insufficient Soviet support for their defeat by Israel in the October, 1973, war. In addition, most Arab states came to the conclusion that Moscow had no influence over Israel, and that only Washington could influence that state. Many Arab governmentsincluding radical Syria for a time -cooperated with the United States seeking a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow was on the diplomatic sidelines. 'Katz, Russia and Arabia, p. fOO.
At the same time, in the Persian Gulf, the Shah of Iran was a close ally of the United States. The conservative Arab monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) were also firmly linked with the West; except for Kuwait, they all refused even to exchange embassies with Moscow. Only in Iraq and South Yemen was the Soviet Union influential. But even in Iraq, the ruling Baath party did not hesitate to suppress the large Iraqi Communist party.
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In 1978-1979, however, the Soviet Union appeared to be gaining influence in the gulf and the Middle East. The American-sponsored Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel alienated almost all Arab governments, since no provision was made for an independent Palestinian state. Most Arab governments broke relations with Egypt and criticized the United States for sponsoring an agreement that they felt sheltered Israel from having to make important concessions on the Palestinian issue. Not only did radical states like Syria come to rely more heavily on the Soviet Union, but even antiCommunist Saudi Arabia began the process of improving relations with Moscow. In addition, the stridently anti-American Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's rise to power in 1979 led to the loss of Washington's influence in Iran. Moscow hoped to ally itself with Teheran on the basis of a common anti-American foreign policy. 3 The situation changed, however, at the end of 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's efforts to expand its influence, especially in the gulf, were seriously set back. Saudi Arabia immediately ended its flirtation with Moscow and organized the Islamic summit conference in January, 1980, which condemned the attack (only Syria and South Yemen refused to attend). 4 Saudi Arabia and several other monarchies feared that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a Soviet plan to advance to the gulf and eventually to attack or subvert them. Much to Moscow's dismay, these states increased rather than decreased their security ties with the United States and the West.
Soviet policy elsewhere in the gulf was not particularly successful either. When Iraq invaded Iran in September, 1980, Moscow quickly halted direct military assistance to Baghdad (indirect aid through third countries continued) and began helping Teheran. Because it borders the U.S.S.R., has a long coastline on the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and possesses a relatively large population, Iran was (and still is) a strategically much more important country to the Soviet Union than is Iraq. the Arabs impressed with American resolve when the administration of President Ronald Reagan withdrew the United States peacekeeping mission from Beirut after it had come under increasing attack from a variety of extremist Arab groups.
In addition, several moderate Arab states were frustrated by their inability to purchase the American weapons they wanted, because of congressional fears that these arms would be used against Israel. In 1984, both Jordan and Kuwait announced that because they were not allowed to buy certain American arms, they intended to purchase them from the Soviet Union instead. The stage was thus set for further Soviet foreign policy gains under Gorbachev.
7

THE GORBACHEV ERA
Since Gorbachev came to power in March, 1985, Soviet leaders appear to have improved their ties significantly with all the major countries of the gulf. Moscow has managed the difficult feat of retaining its position in Iraq while improving relations with both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran.
Moscow's minimal relations with the GCC states began to expand soon after Gorbachev came to power. In late 1985, Oman and the United Arab Emirates agreed to establish diplomatic ties with the U.S.S.R. for the first time. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar still have no formal relations with Moscow, but their informal contacts with the Soviet Union have increased.
The most important Soviet diplomatic breakthrough with the conservative Arab Gulf states, however, occurred in Kuwait. In 1986, Kuwaiti officials had asked the United States to protect their oil tankers from increasing Iranian attack in retaliation for Kuwait's financial and material support to Iraq. The Reagan administration initially refused, because it did not want to damage its secret effort to establish better ties with Teheran. Kuwait made the same request to Moscow, which agreed in early 1987. The United States government then immediately reversed itself and offered to protect all Kuwaiti tankers in order to exclude the Soviet Union from any role in the gulf. 12 "Gorbachev's Gulf, Too," The Economist (London), October 24, 1987, pp. 13-15. 13 See, for example, Tass report in FBIS, June 25, 1987, pp. E1-E2.
14 For an excellent analysis of Soviet policy toward the Middle East since Gorbachev came to power, see Galia Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 1 (Fall, 1987) . 14 In pressing his peace proposals for both the gulf war and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gorbachev seemed to be making the implicit argument that since the Soviet Union was the only superpower that could talk with all sides of both conflicts, all sides should turn to Moscow to help resolve them. Further, since Washington cannot talk to all sides, the United States is unable to help bring about peace, but will only worsen both conflicts. This argument, of course, is similar to the one the United States used to make with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Although the Soviet Union has done little so far to actually resolve these two conflicts, Gorbachev has succeeded in convincing both Arab and Israeli moderates that Soviet participation can enhance the peace process and that attempting to exclude the Soviet Union, as the United States has suggested, is counterproductive. " Ha'aretz(Tel Aviv), March 19, 1986 , in FBIS-Affi4, March 21, 1986 vl Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), October 17, 1986 , in FBIS-MEA, October 20, 1986 vi Yedi'ot Aharanot (Tel Aviv), April 1, 1986 , in FBIS-ME4, April 1, 1986 
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